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The Impact of Brexit on the Environment: Exploring the Dynamics of a 
Complex Relationship 
Chris Hilson* 
 
Abstract 
Brexit is likely to have a significant impact on the environment. In the current article I argue against 
seeing the traffic as all one-way. While there was a temptation for the advocates of staying in the 
European Union (EU), in the context of referendum campaigning, to portray the United Kingdom 
(UK) as a laggard pressured into positive environmental performance by the EU as leader, the reality 
is that the UK has also strengthened the EU’s environmental policy in some areas and seen its own 
weakened in others. Influence in both directions has also varied over time. The article goes on to 
consider core ‘Leave’ arguments around sovereignty and ‘taking back control’, exploring the 
implications of these in the specific context of environmental governance. In discussing subsidiarity, 
it concludes that leaving the EU will not remove the need for the pooling of some sovereignty over 
environmental matters at international level and, in the context of devolution, at UK level.    
 
                                                          
* University of Reading, UK. c.j.hilson@reading.ac.uk. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 
British Academy, 'Brexit and the Environment: A Roundtable', 30th January 2017 and at the workshop 'The 
Future of European Policy in the European Union', 19-20 January 2017, Centre for European Research, 
University of Gothenburg. I am grateful, for their comments, to those present and also to the journal’s referees 
and editors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There have been a number of excellent, comprehensive studies on the environmental implications of 
the United Kingdom (UK) leaving the European Union (EU), often referred to as ‘Brexit’.1 Detailed as 
these existing studies are, they do not always systematically set out the dynamic interaction 
between the UK and the EU, with influence – both positive and negative – travelling in both 
directions over time and across different policy areas within environmental policy. Nor do they 
necessarily unpick the various factors which have a bearing on any assessment of whether leaving 
the EU is likely to be environmentally deleterious. In the current article I aim to do both of these. 
The article consists of two parts. In the first part, I consider the potential impact of Brexit on 
environmental policy and hence environmental quality. While this part considers the potential 
practical consequences, the second then considers the normative consequences of Brexit for issues 
of sovereignty and control – issues which featured strongly in the referendum debates. I argue that 
subsidiarity is central to the discussion and that repatriating environmental competence will typically 
fail to produce the desired level of effective control over environmental problems. I also highlight, as 
others have, that environmental sovereignty, once returned from ‘Brussels’, gives rise to questions 
about environmental federalism within the UK and the appetite of devolved administrations for a 
degree of Brussels-replacing central control. Both parts of the article therefore concern the title’s 
                                                          
1 Environmental Audit Committee (EAC), Third Report of Session 2015–16, ‘EU and UK Environmental Policy’, 
HC 537; Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP), ‘Brexit: The Implications for UK Environmental 
Policy and Regulation’ (2016), available at: http://ieep.eu/assets/2016/IEEP_2016_Brexit_-
_Implications_for_UK_Environmental_Policy_and_Regulations.pdf; C. Burns et al., ‘The EU Referendum and 
the UK Environment: An Expert Review’ (2016), available at: http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Expert-Review_EU-referendum-UK-environment.pdf; C. Burns, A. Jordan & V. 
Gravey, ‘The EU Referendum and the UK Environment: the Future Under a ‘Hard’ and a ‘Soft’ Brexit’’ (2016), 
available at: http://ukandeu.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/The-Environment-under-Soft-or-Hard-
Brexit.pdf; HM Government, ‘Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union: Environment and Climate Change’ (2014), ch. 2; V. Heyvaert and A. Čavoški, ‘UK 
Environmental Law Post-Brexit’, in M. Dougan (ed.), The UK After Brexit (Intersentia, 2017), pp. 115-133. 
‘impact of Brexit on the environment’: the first part covers environmental policy and quality; the 
second part relates to environmental governance. 
In deciding whether Brexit is likely to be good or bad for the environment in policy terms, it is 
important to note that any such assessment is inevitably value-laden. Although Table 1 below 
presents a form of ledger of positive and negative aspects of Brexit, the discussion that follows 
illustrates that there may be room for reasonable disagreement on where a policy is placed. 
Different sides may be equally committed to environmental protection, but have competing visions 
of the best policy means for achieving this.2 The EU emissions trading system (ETS) is a good 
example. To what extent one regards the ETS as a force for good is likely to depend in part on one’s 
faith in market-based instruments. Moreover, while this article mostly focuses on the potentially 
environmentally deleterious impact of Brexit on the specific policy areas that constitute the EU’s 
environmental acquis, it is also worth observing that some believe the very nature of the EU as a 
growth-based trading block as a whole is environmentally harmful and that the UK would therefore 
be better off out.3 
 
2. MULTI-DIRECTIONAL EFFECTS 
 
 
                                                          
2 E.g., the UK Environment Secretary, Michael Gove, has stated: ‘While the EU has often been a force for good 
in raising environmental standards, some of the means haven't necessarily been the most effective regulatory 
tools - so getting those right will be critical to Brexit success’ (R. Harrabin, ‘Brexit 'Will Enhance' UK Wildlife 
Laws – Gove’, BBC News, 19 June 2017, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-
40331919. 
3 E.g. J. Jones, ‘The EU is an Outsized Behemoth Beyond Reform: The Green Case for Brexit’, The Guardian, 
Comment is Free, 8 June 2016, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/08/eu-
reform-green-brexit: ‘The most profound weakness of the EU, from the Green point of view, is that it is a 
super-sized top-down dogmatic project of endless industrial development and growth. It fosters the pointless 
carting of goods enormous distances, and it smashes local resilience and self-reliance. Often well-intentioned 
environmental policies are outweighed at every turn by the more fundamental drivers of its bid to turn the 
whole of Europe into a paradise for (environmentally damaging) agribusiness and industry.’ The Green Party 
itself was in favour of Remain (being more concerned with the threat of Brexit to the environmental acquis): 
Green Party, ‘Natalie Bennett Unveils Our "Three Yeses" to Europe’, 23 Jan. 2013, available at: 
https://www.greenparty.org.uk/news/2013/01/23/natalie-bennett-unveils-our-three-yeses-to-europe. 
Table 1: The impact on environmental policy of UK membership of the EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Polity 
impacted 
                                                                                                                     Policy outcome 
 
 
 
 
 
EU  
Negative Positive 
EU policy diluted by UK 
membership 
Air quality 
Fracking 
Energy efficiency 
Soils 
EU Emissions Trading System 
(ETS)  (early) 
EU policy strengthened 
by UK membership 
Climate Change (targets, 
recent EU ETS, and 
external policy, but not 
renewables or energy 
efficiency) 
Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) 
Common Fisheries Policy 
(CFP) 
Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control 
(IPPC)/Industrial 
Emissions Directive (IED) 
Habitats (early) 
UK UK diluted by EU 
CAP 
CFP 
Biofuels 
 
UK strengthened by EU 
Bathing Water 
Drinking water 
Air Quality 
Recent wildlife 
protection (except farm 
birds)  
Waste 
Renewables 
Chemicals 
Genetically Modified 
Organisms (GMOs) 
Fracking 
Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) 
 
Table 1 is designed to show the interaction between the UK and the EU in environmental policy in a 
bi-directional and bi-dimensional manner; one which shows that the impacts have not all been one 
way, and have not been uniformly positive or negative, but rather a mix of both.4 In the campaigning 
and debate leading up to the EU referendum, the Remain side typically emphasized the ways in 
which the EU had been good for the UK environment and that leaving would therefore be harmful. 
                                                          
4 See IEEP, ‘Report on the Influence of EU Policies on the Environment’ (2013), at p. 1 (stressing a two-way 
relationship), available at: http://www.ieep.eu/assets/1230/Final_Report_-
_Influence_of_EU_Policies_on_the_Environment.pdf. 
This side of the argument is captured by the bottom right hand box of Table 1 and the policy areas 
contained within, such as drinking water, bathing water and waste policy, where EU Directives have 
undoubtedly led to significant improvements in UK standards. A number of Remainers did however 
also mention the few EU policy areas in the bottom left hand box which have not necessarily been 
environmentally beneficial for the UK, including in particular the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
and the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP).5 The CAP, for example, has gone hand in hand with an 
intensification of agriculture and has been associated with, inter alia, a decline in previously 
common farmland birds and diffuse nitrate pollution of watercourses from fertilizers.6 In that 
respect, it can be argued that non-environmental EU policy7 has had as much, if not more, of an 
effect on the quality of the UK environment as dedicated environmental policy. An assessment of 
the effects of Brexit on the environment, therefore, should not be limited to a consideration of 
environmental law and policy alone. 
Understandably in a referendum aimed at persuading UK voters, the effects of UK membership on 
the EU received less attention. However, in assessing the overall effects of Brexit on the 
environment, these effects – set out in the top half of Table 1 – also require careful consideration as 
part of a bi-directional assessment. Some have been positive. For example, the UK has driven the EU 
on climate change targets8 and has encouraged the greening of the CAP.9 It was also instrumental in 
the design of the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) industrial emissions regime, 
                                                          
5 See also, e.g., biofuels, where EU policy has been questioned on environmental grounds both by those on the 
Leave side (see, e.g., dissenting report by P. Lilley, EAC, n. 1 above) and by the environmental movement (see, 
e.g., G. Monbiot, ‘These Brexiters Will Grind Our Environment Into the Dust’, The Guardian, 20 July 2016, 
available at:https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jul/20/brexiters-make-britain-countryside-
like-kansas). 
6 Burns et al., n. 1 above, p. 37. 
7 Although, of course, EU agricultural policy has for some time contained agri-environmental policy within it 
(albeit of questionable overall ambition). 
8 IEEP, n. 4 above, pp. 7, 24; Burns et al., n. 1 above, p. 16. 
9 Burns et al., n. 1 above, p. 38; written evidence of V. Gravey et al. submitted to the HC, EAC inquiry, ‘The 
Future of the Natural Environment after the EU Referendum’ (Session 2016–17), para. 13, available at: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/environmental-audit-
committee/the-future-of-the-natural-environment-after-the-eu-referendum/written/35891.html. 
which later became the Industrial Emissions Directive.10 EU external policy on the environment has 
also been enhanced by UK input, especially in the area of climate change negotiations. Membership 
of the EU has given the UK more influence than it would otherwise have had – the UK gets the 
benefits of putting forward its own views but with the added weight of a larger bloc’s platform to 
support them.11 Other effects, where the UK government has blocked or watered down EU 
environmental legislation, have been negative. Recent examples include policies on air quality,12 
fracking,13 energy efficiency,14 and soils.15 
 
3. A DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP 
It is tempting to see the relationship between the EU and UK in static rather than dynamic terms 
across time. The temptation is thus to regard the UK as forever the laggard and the EU as always the 
leader. While it is not hard to see why pre-referendum campaigning on the Remain side would take 
this stance, in reality the UK government’s environmental credentials have fluctuated over time and 
across environmental policy areas. The EU’s environmental record, too, changes according to the 
political complexion of the European Commission and Member State governments in the Council of 
                                                          
10 Directive 2010/75/EU [2010] OJ L 334/17. EAC (n. 1 above, para. 22; cf. N. Haigh, EU Environmental Policy: Its 
Journey to Centre Stage (Routledge, 2016), pp. 197-203, noting resistance to the British idea of a single 
permitting authority. 
11 Burns et al., n. 1 above, p. 11; J. Gummer et al., ‘Within the EU, Britain Can Take the Lead on Tackling Climate 
Change’, The Guardian, 18 Apr. 2016, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/apr/18/within-the-eu-britain-can-take-the-lead-on-
tackling-climate-change ; EAC, n. 1 above, paras 15-8; IEEP, n. 4 above, p. 7; R. Davis, ‘Should Environmentalists 
Support the UK’s Membership of the EU?’, Energydesk Greenpeace, 17 Mar. 2016, available at: 
http://energydesk.greenpeace.org/2016/03/17/comment-brexit-environmentalists-support-uk-eu-
membership. 
12 A. Neslen, ‘EU Dilutes Proposal to Halve Air Pollution Deaths After UK Lobbying’, The Guardian, 3 June 2016, 
available at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jun/03/eu-dilutes-proposal-halve-air-
pollution-deaths-uk-lobbying. 
13 D. Carrington, ‘UK Defeats European Bid for Fracking Regulations’, The Guardian, 14 Jan. 2014, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jan/14/uk-defeats-european-bid-fracking-regulations.  
14 EAC, n. 1 above, para. 23. 
15 DEFRA, ‘Safeguarding our Soils: A Strategy for England’ (2009), p. 3; G. Monbiot, ‘The Farming Lobby Has 
Wrecked Efforts to Defend Our Soil’, The Guardian, 5 June 2014, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/georgemonbiot/2014/jun/05/the-farming-lobby-has-wrecked-
efforts-to-defend-our-soil. 
Ministers. Some of the policy areas listed in Table 1 provide a good illustration of this. For example, 
the EU ETS could legitimately be placed in either the ‘EU policy diluted’ or the ‘EU policy 
strengthened’ box.  Insofar as the UK pushed for this policy in the first place16 and it has become 
regarded by many as a somewhat ineffective neoliberal instrument,17 it might legitimately be put in 
the negative top left hand box. However, the UK has also been instrumental more recently in trying 
to strengthen the policy by restricting allowances,18 which could mean UK influence belongs more in 
the positive top right hand box. Similarly, while the UK was an early advocate of nature conservation 
laws and was thus supportive of the Habitats Directive19 at the time of its inception,20 in recent years 
the UK Government, arguably, has come to regard the Directive as a burdensome obstruction to 
development projects.21 As regards the EU’s changing stance vis-a-vis the environment, the current 
Juncker-led EU Commission, for example, worried some environmentalists with its Better 
Regulation-based ‘fitness check’ of the Birds22 and Habitats Directives.23 
The dynamic nature of the EU-UK environmental relationship requires consideration not only of the 
past and present but also to the future. In the lead-up to the referendum, the future direction of the 
UK Government’s environmental policy was undoubtedly a cause of concern in some quarters. 
Anecdotally, many environmentally conscious voters appeared minded to vote Remain in part 
                                                          
16 IEEP, n. 4 above, p. 25; Burns et al., n. 1 above, p. 16. 
17 See e.g. G. Winter, ‘The Climate Is No Commodity: Taking Stock of the Emissions Trading System’ (2010) 
22(1) Journal of Environmental Law, pp. 1-25. 
18 Burns et al., n. 1 above, p. 18. 
19 Council Directive 92/43/EEC on the Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and Flora [1992] OJ 
L206/7. 
20 Burns et al., n. 1 above, p. 138; T. Hutchings (WWF), oral evidence, House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Union, Energy and Environment Sub-Committee, ‘Brexit: Environment and Climate Change’, 26 Oct. 
2016, at p. 22, available at: 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-energy-and-
environment-subcommittee/brexit-environment-and-climate-change/oral/42398.pdf,. 
21 As opposed to ensuring sustainable development. For details of the government’s negative view, see e.g. 
HM Treasury Autumn Statement 2011, at para. 1.99; A. Neslen, ‘Brexit Would Free UK From 'Spirit-crushing' 
Green Directives, Says Minister’, The Guardian, 30 May 2016, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/30/brexit-spirit-crushing-green-directives-minister-george-
eustice. 
22 Directive 2009/147/EC on the Conservation of Wild Birds [2010] OJ L20/7. 
23 IEEP, n. 1 above, p. 20; European Commission, ‘Fitness Check of the Birds and Habitats Directives’, available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/legislation/fitness_check/index_en.htm; see further V. Gravey, 
‘Nature Directives ‘Fit for Purpose’: A Turning Point for EU Policy Dismantling?’, Environmental Europe? blog, 7 
Dec. 2016, available at: http://environmentaleurope.ideasoneurope.eu/2016/12/07/naturealertrefit. 
because of a fear that a Conservative government which had previously referred to environmental 
issues as ‘Green crap’24 would see Brexit as an opportunity to deregulate troublesome 
environmental ‘red tape’.25 Deregulation – both in general and in relation to the environment 
specifically – also featured strongly in the Leave campaign.26 Nevertheless, the Government’s 
balance of competences review on the environment and climate change in the run up to the 
referendum in general revealed no obvious clamouring for deregulation by environmental and 
industry stakeholders .27As for the Government’s own view, the Environmental Audit Committee 
(EAC) report made clear: 
The Government’s renegotiation of the UK’s relationship with the EU did not explicitly include a 
reference to the environment. Mr Stewart, Minister at DEFRA, told us: ‘We are not intending to 
renegotiate those directives. […] The basic structure of the competences, the basic structure of 
European environmental law in relation to our Department I think is very close to what we think is 
sensible. It is what we would intend to do in the United Kingdom.’ Lord Bourne, Minister at DECC, 
said, ‘in this area of energy and climate change, the UK’s interests are very much within a strong EU. 
[…] this area is not part of the renegotiation. We are very comfortable with the EU stance.’28 
Of course, while that was true of the pre-referendum Government, no one knew what a post-Brexit 
government might look like. Many suspected that it might be led by pro-Brexit politicians on the 
right of the Conservative party, a number of whom had climate sceptic views and were 
unsympathetic to the environment more generally. To that extent therefore, any deregulatory fear 
was potentially well founded. In the end, the fall-out from the referendum produced a new 
government led by a supposedly ‘quiet Remainer’ Prime Minister, with a leading Leave campaigner 
                                                          
24 J. Garman, ‘Green Crap’? Cameron's U-turn on the Environment is Just as Shameful as Clegg's on Tuition 
Fees’, The Independent, 21 Nov. 2013, available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/green-
crap-camerons-u-turn-on-the-environment-is-just-as-shameful-as-cleggs-on-tuition-fees-8954747.html. 
25 See further L. Fisher, ‘Sovereignty, Red Tape…and the Environment’, PSA blog, 17 June 2016, available at: 
https://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/blog/sovereignty-red-tape%E2%80%A6and-environment. 
26 On the environment, see e.g. Neslen, n. 21 above. 
27 HM Government, n. 1 above. 
28 EAC, n. 1 above, at paras 56-7. 
as Environment Secretary and with three prominent ‘Brexiteer’29 members of the Cabinet tasked 
with negotiations on Brexit, including those relating to the environment. This Government remained 
in power after a snap election in June 2017, albeit with a much reduced majority.  
It may be too early to predict the Government’s ideological approach post-Brexit. However, in 
contemplating the impact of Brexit on the environment, political will is in any event only part of the 
equation. In practice, significant change in UK environmental policy seems unlikely for two reasons. 
Firstly, the policy literature tells us that path dependence from a relationship built up over many 
decades means that there will be a significant inclination towards maintaining the status quo.30 
Secondly, even if historically embedded ways of doing things were easily undone at the best of times 
(which path dependence tells us they are not), Brexit represents far from the best of times. The 
overwhelming work pressure on the UK Government, Parliament and the civil service in dealing with 
many of the procedural mechanics of Brexit, both centrally and arguably even more so within the 
devolved administrations of Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, means that there is unlikely to 
be time to carry out a root and branch overhaul of environmental policy, at least in the short to 
medium term. This does not mean that no changes will occur. Firstly, the Government is on record 
as stating that roughly one third of EU environment legislation will not be carried across via the 
European Union (Withdrawal) Bill31  (the statute designed to repeal the future legal authority of EU 
law in the UK while simultaneously carrying over the existing body of EU law onto the UK books).32 
This is because there are some policies which, on leaving the EU, cannot easily take immediate legal 
                                                          
29 Those on the Leave side in favour of Brexit have often been styled ‘Brexiteers’, with a nod to Dumas’s The 
Three Musketeers. 
30 B. Flynn, ‘What a Difference a Vote Makes? Second Guessing British-EU Environmental Policy Interactions 
After Brexit’, Environmental Europe? blog, 1 Aug. 2016, available at: 
http://environmentaleurope.ideasoneurope.eu/2016/08/01/difference-vote-makes-second-guessing-british-
eu-environmental-policy-interactions-brexit/. On path dependence, see e.g. P. Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, 
Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’ (2000) 94(2) The American Political Science Review, pp. 251-267; S. 
Krasner, ‘Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical Dynamics’ (1984) 16(2) Comparative 
Politics, pp. 223-246. 
31 Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-2019/0005/18005.pd. The Bill was 
initially referred to as the Great Repeal Bill and then just the Repeal Bill.  
32 Oral evidence before the Environmental Audit Committee inquiry, ‘The Future of the Natural Environment 
after the EU Referendum’, 25 Oct. 2016 (Session 2016–17), Q. 327 (Andrea Leadsom MP).   
effect through such a Bill. Obvious examples include legislation that requires some form of EU level 
authorization process or involvement such as the REACH Regulation on chemicals33 and the EU ETS.34 
Anticipated changes are not driven by a deregulation rationale, but by the need to deal with the 
practical realities of transposition post-Brexit.35 Secondly, while root and branch overhaul of 
environmental legal frameworks is unlikely, small-scale tinkering could occur and could still produce 
a major change in the effect of the law.  For example, keeping the structures of the Birds36 and 
Habitats37 Directives in place but adopting minor changes to the conditions for derogation or to the 
interpretation of ‘overriding reasons of imperative public interest’ to justify development that harms 
a European Site (and what constitutes acceptable compensation) could significantly alter the impact 
of the law.38 
For some time in the future after Brexit, then, a combination of path dependence and administrative 
pressures makes significant structural change to UK environmental policy unlikely, at least in areas 
which do not face Withdrawal Bill transposition difficulties. In that respect, UK policy in the short to 
medium term is not unlike the EU’s as far as ability to change is concerned. Although the EU is 
currently going through what might be characterized as a deregulatory phase in respect of its 
environmental policy, in practice the rate of change is not great: as the 2016 UK Environmental Audit 
Committee report observed, given the need to secure agreement among many Member States, it is 
not easy to change EU environmental policy.39 Thus, notwithstanding the fundamentally dynamic 
nature of the UK and EU relationship, the rate of change should not be overplayed. The EU 
                                                          
33 See further HC, EAC, ‘The Future of Chemicals Regulation after the EU Referendum’, Eleventh Report of 
Session 2016–17, HC 912. 
34 The Repeal Bill White Paper provides the e.g. of reg. 6(2)(b) of the Offshore Petroleum Activities 
(Conservation of Habitats) Regulations 2001, SI 2001/1754, which contains a requirement to obtain an opinion 
from the European Commission. This will require removal (and possible replacement with a UK body) via 
secondary legislation (Department for Exiting the European Union, ‘Legislating for the United Kingdom’s 
Withdrawal from the European Union’, Cm 9446, 2017, at p. 20). 
35 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 12th Report of Session 2016–17, ‘Brexit: Environment and 
Climate Change’, HL Paper 109, at para. 58. 
36 N. 22 above. 
37 N. 19 above. 
38 I am grateful to one of the anonymous referees for this point. 
39 EAC, n. 1 above at paras 29-32. 
environmental acquis, albeit not immobile, is relatively unmoving. The UK capacity to change post-
Brexit, in turn, is perhaps more constrained in practice than some might expect. 
 
4. FUTURE RELATIONSHIP MODEL 
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides for a two-year negotiation period once 
the UK government has triggered the Brexit process by formally communicating its intention to 
leave, which it did at the end of March 2017. The aim is for the UK and the EU to come to an 
agreement within this two-year period, at which point the UK will cease to be an EU Member State. 
If such an agreement cannot be reached then, under Article 50 TEU, the UK will drop out of the EU at 
the end of the period, unless the other 27 Member States unanimously agree to an extension 
beyond two years. While any agreement arising from this process is expected to include the terms of 
the ‘divorce’ – how resident EU citizens, EU staff pensions, existing UK budget contributions, assets 
and so on are to be dealt with –to what extent it will also include the terms of the UK’s future 
relationship with the EU remains less clear. There is a view that it may be impractical to cover both 
the divorce and future relationship within the two year negotiation period and that the future 
relationship will therefore be left to a separate, ‘mixed agreement’. In addition to European 
Parliament consent, this would require ratification by all EU Member States in accordance with their 
own constitutional arrangements (as with, for instance, the recent EU-Canada CETA bilateral trade 
deal).40 The UK government has nevertheless expressed the hope that an Article 50 TEU agreement 
would cover both issues. This would secure the twin advantages of requiring only qualified majority 
voting by the Council (and the consent of the European Parliament) for its approval and avoiding a 
damaging gap period during which, in the absence of a future relationship agreement or a 
transitional arrangement, the UK’s relationship status with the EU could fall back on World Trade 
                                                          
40 Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) Between Canada and the European Union and its 
Member States, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ceta/ceta-chapter-by-chapter.  
Organization (WTO) rules (and associated tariffs). The European Council, in contrast, has stated that 
it stands ‘ready to engage in preliminary and preparatory discussions’ on the future relationship 
agreement in the context of negotiations under Article 50 TEU, but only when it ‘decides that 
sufficient progress has been made in the first phase towards reaching a satisfactory agreement on 
the arrangements for an orderly withdrawal.’41 
Whatever legal form is finally adopted, the eventual model chosen for the UK’s future relationship 
with the EU is likely to make a significant difference to whether Brexit turns out to be positive or 
negative for the environment. Since the referendum, there has been much discussion of the nature 
of the potentially available models. The adjectives used to describe Brexit have been many and 
varied including, for example, ‘dirty’ Brexit, ‘clean’ Brexit, and even ‘red white and blue’ Brexit. 
However, most commentators have settled on the UK’s options lying somewhere on a spectrum 
between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Brexit.42 A hard Brexit could take a variety of forms but is essentially one 
that would take the EU outside the single market and probably also the customs union. A soft Brexit 
would preserve full single market access and could involve the UK remaining a member of the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and joining the European Economic Area (EEA) (the so-called 
Norway model). A slightly less soft variant would involve entering into sector-by-sector bilateral 
agreements with the EU (the so-called Swiss model). 
If the UK were to adopt a Norway model based on EEA membership, then most existing EU 
environmental policy would remain in place, with the key exceptions being the Habitats43 and Birds44 
                                                          
41 European Council, ‘European Council (Art. 50) guidelines for Brexit negotiations’, 29 Apr. 2017, Press release 
220/17, emphasis added, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/04/29-
euco-brexit-guidelines. 
42 It should be noted that this spectrum was rejected by the Prime Minister Theresa May in her speech to the 
2016 Conservative Party Conference: ‘there is no such thing as a choice between “soft Brexit” and “hard 
Brexit”.  This line of argument – in which “soft Brexit” amounts to some form of continued EU membership and 
“hard Brexit” is a conscious decision to reject trade with Europe – is simply a false dichotomy …   it is not going 
to [sic] a “Norway model”. It’s not going to be a “Switzerland model”.  It is going to be an agreement between 
an independent, sovereign United Kingdom and the European Union.’ Available at: 
http://press.conservatives.com/post/151239411635/prime-minister-britain-after-brexit-a-vision-of. 
43 N. 19 above. 
44 N. 22 above. 
Directives and the Bathing Water Directive.45 Under such a model, policy areas with significant 
environmental implications, notably agriculture and fisheries, would also return to UK control. A 
Swiss-style soft Brexit would preserve much less of the EU environmental acquis. In the Swiss case, 
there has merely been some attempt at coordination between the EU ETS and the Swiss ETS. 
Switzerland also enjoys (paid) membership of the European Environment Agency.46 In the case of a 
hard Brexit followed by a Canada/CETA-style free trade agreement, there would not even be this 
minimal level of direct involvement in EU environmental policy institutions (although CETA does 
provide for some cooperation on environmental issues47). In addition, the Canada-EU Agreement 
largely preserves the right of each country to choose its own levels of environmental protection,48 
subject to certain exhortations not to lower standards in a race to the bottom.49 Thus, if either a 
Swiss-style soft Brexit or a hard Brexit transpires, the landscape for UK environmental policy 
becomes less predictable than with the softer EEA Norway model which preserves much of the 
status quo. 
However, in terms of the impact of the UK’s future relationship with the EU on the dynamics at play 
in Table 1, either a hard or a soft Brexit scenario removes the top left and right-hand boxes from 
consideration. In neither scenario will the UK retain the ability to block or dilute proposed EU 
legislation that it does not like. On this basis, Brexit of either kind would (ceteris paribus) be positive 
for the stringency of EU environmental policy (and, with the Norway model, therefore also for UK 
environmental policy which would be obliged to implement it).50 Nor, of course, will the UK be able 
to positively influence EU environmental policy.  
                                                          
45 Directive 2006/7/EC Concerning the Management of Bathing Water Quality [2006] OJ L64/37. 
46 https://www.eda.admin.ch/dea/en/home/bilaterale-abkommen/abkommen-
umsetzung/abkommenstexte/umwelt.html. 
47 Arts 22.3 and 24.12 CETA, n. 40 above. 
48 Art. 24.3 CETA. 
49 Art. 24.5 CETA. 
50 M. Le Page, ‘Green Lining? Five Ways Brexit Could be Good for the Environment’, New Scientist, 29 June 
2016. 
Now, considering the inverse direction of influence represented in the bottom two boxes of Table 1, 
it should not be assumed, that EU influence on UK environmental policy will disappear after Brexit, 
even on a hard Brexit model. The single market of the UK’s large trading neighbour is bound to exert 
a considerable influence over its domestic policy. This is particularly true with regard to 
environmentally-related product standards51 (for example on vehicle emissions)52 since UK 
manufacturers will most likely wish to continue to export to the single market.53 There would 
inevitably be pressure to harmonize relevant UK standards with those of the EU. Hence, even after 
leaving the EU, the UK could still find itself in a position where its environmental policy is 
strengthened by the EU. However, for environmental and climate targets and associated process 
standards, the influence of competition from the single market could also be negative. If the EU 
adopts weaker standards than the UK, then the latter may find it hard to subject its own industries54 
to unilateral stringent targets which could harm their competitiveness when compared with the 
weaker EU rules facing their rivals. In this case, even after leaving the EU, the UK could still find itself 
in the bottom left box in Table 1, with its environmental policy weakened by the EU. Thus, even after 
a hard Brexit, the single market’s continuing influence on UK environmental policy means that the 
UK will still be affected both positively and, potentially, negatively. However, regardless of whether a 
soft or hard Brexit is pursued, the scope for the UK to continue to influence EU environmental policy 
will be severely curtailed. 
 
5. CAUSATION 
                                                          
51 As well as, in some instances, process standards (where the EU exerts extra-territorial control over process 
standards in relation to products that want access to the single market). See J Scott, ‘Extraterritoriality and 
Territorial Extension in EU Law’ (2014) 62(1) American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 87-125. 
52 Directive 2007/46/EC establishing a Framework for the Approval of Motor Vehicles [2007] OJ L 263/1. 
53 IEEP, n. 1 above, p. 7; Heyvaert and Čavoški, n. 1 above, p. 125. 
54 Including agriculture – see Gravey et al., n. 9 above, para. 13. 
As Burns notes,55 it is notoriously difficult to state with any degree of certainty that improvements to 
UK environmental quality were caused by EU membership. Some changes may have happened in 
time anyway, even without EU influence (due to, for instance, policy convergence), and it is not 
always possible to disentangle multiple causes of environmental change (for example, separating the 
impact of EU policy from improvements to environmental quality due to deindustrialization, or other 
economic changes such as the ‘dash to gas’).   
When assessing impact, time has a key bearing on assessing whether leaving the EU is positive or 
negative for the environment. Before the referendum, much was made of the significant positive 
impact the EU has had historically on UK environmental policy. Take the Bathing Water Directive56 as 
an example. Many rightly point to the impact of this instrument, along with the Urban Waste Water 
Treatment Directive,57 on the quality of UK bathing waters previously severely polluted with 
untreated sewage effluent. However, in trying to establish whether, on balance, the EU has been 
positive for UK environmental policy, we cannot easily assess whether the UK would, in time, have 
taken action itself in these areas in any event. All we can safely conclude is that at the time the UK 
was not acting and EU policy pressured it into doing so. Environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
provides a further example, including evidence of some prior UK action in this case. While the EU’s 
1985 EIA Directive58 undoubtedly pressured the UK to adopt EIA as a procedural mechanism within 
land use planning decision making, the UK had in fact issued a report considering EIA in 1977.59 In 
doing so, it had likely taken inspiration from the United States’ (US) 1969 National Environmental 
Policy Act.60 However, progress in implementing the report’s recommendations was very slow and 
was eventually overtaken by the EU Directive’s requirements.61 Although the UK may eventually 
                                                          
55 Burns et al., n. 1 above, pp. 8-9, at 135-6. 
56 Directive 2006/7/EC [2006] OJ L64/37. 
57 Directive 91/271/EEC [1991] OJ L135/40. 
58 Directive 85/337/EEC [1985] OJ L175/40. 
59 Scottish Natural Heritage (SNH), ‘Environmental Assessment Handbook’, Annex 6, available at 
http://www.snh.org.uk/publications/on-line/heritagemanagement/EIA/annex6.shtml. 
60 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332. 
61 SNH, n. 59 above. 
have acted on EIA on its own accord, it was hostile to the proposed Directive which it managed to 
water down.62 Even then, as Jordan notes, ‘left to its own devices, Britain would almost certainly 
have adopted a much more informal and voluntary system than the one promoted by the EU’ and 
with a narrower scope in terms of projects caught by the regime.63 
Next, moving away from the historical, there is the separate question of whether the EU remains a 
necessary current pressure for the UK in relation to environmental policy. With bathing water the 
answer is that it is less called for today64 in that over 96% of UK beaches are now of sufficient quality 
or above.65 That said, there is no room for complacency as the UK remains second bottom in the EU 
in terms of the rates of bathing waters with poor quality.66 Air quality is probably the most obvious 
area of environmental law where EU-based pressure today still plays a significant role. The number 
of lives lost as a result of NO2 pollution is one of the highest in the EU,67 and EU law has been 
instrumental in the NGO ClientEarth’s court-based efforts to apply pressure on the UK government 
to improve air quality.68 
It is also worth pausing to consider the often mentioned ‘fall-back’ impacts of international law in 
terms of the causal relation between EU influence and UK impact in Table 1. Areas where UK 
environmental policy has been strengthened by the EU, identified in the bottom right box of the 
table, would not automatically be endangered by the UK’s departure from the EU. This is because in 
a number of areas the UK is subject to obligations under international environmental law which will 
                                                          
62 A. Jordan, The Europeanization of British Environmental Policy: A Departmental Perspective (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002), at p. 180. 
63 Ibid., p. 181. See also p. 186. 
64 IEEP, n. 4 above, para. 4.3.1. 
65 European Environment Agency (EEA), ‘European Bathing Water Quality in 2016’, EEA Report No 5/2017. This 
is compared with only 27% in 1990: DEFRA, Environment Agency and Rory Stewart MP, ‘England’s Bathing 
Water Results 2015’, 5 Nov. 2015, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/news/englands-bathing-
water-results-2015. 
66 EEA, ibid. 
67 EEA, ‘Air Quality in Europe — 2016 Report’, EEA Report No 28/2016, p. 59. 
68 From a line of cases, see e.g. ClientEarth (No.2) v. Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs [2016] EWHC 2740 (Admin). 
provide fall-back protection,69 albeit typically not as comprehensive or anywhere nearly as 
effectively enforceable as EU law. It cannot therefore be said that but for EU membership those 
areas of environmental policy would be completely jeopardized, because the UK’s international 
obligations will still exert a protective effect, albeit a lesser one. 
 
6. DEVOLUTION 
The current section on devolution assumes that the UK will have a common, single future 
relationship model with the EU, as opposed to one that varies internally with, for example, Scotland 
remaining an EU member, or perhaps a member of the single market, while the rest of the UK 
leaves.70 To the extent that environmental policy is a devolved matter in the UK, there are currently 
some differences in policy and performance across the various constituent parts of the UK,71 but 
these differences are kept in check to a considerable degree by common EU standards across many 
areas.72 
                                                          
69 The Aarhus Convention provides a good example of this (Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,Aarhus, (Denmark) 25 June 
1998, in force 30 Oct. 2001. Available at:  
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf). Others include the OSPAR 
Convention (Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Paris 
(France) 22 Sept. 1992, in force 25 March 1998. Available at: https://www.ospar.org/convention/text) and the 
Bern Convention (Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Bern 
(Switzerland) 19 Sept. 1979, in force 1 June 1982. Available at: http://www.coe.int/en/web/bern-convention). 
These are all mixed agreements, where the UK is a party in its own right as well as the EU. Such agreements 
(unlike those which lie in the exclusive competence of the EU) are likely to remain binding on the UK post-
Brexit without the need for renegotiation, although not everyone takes this view: see 
https://www.ukela.org/blog/Brexit-Task-Force/International-environmental-law-after-Brexit.  
70 The Scottish Government expressed a desire to remain part of the EEA: Scottish Government, ‘Scotland’s 
Place in Europe’ (2016), para. 85. However, any form of unique continuing relationship for Scotland seems a 
remote prospect due to likely hostility from other Member States such as the Spanish, wary of such an 
arrangement encouraging their own separatist movements. 
71 See e.g. divergent policy on GMOs between Scotland and England (S. Carrell , ‘Scotland to Issue Formal Ban 
on Genetically Modified Crops’, The Guardian, 9 Aug. 2015, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/aug/09/scotland-to-issue-formal-ban-on-genetically-
modified-crops; and on waste law and the circular economy (S. Holmes, ‘Brexit and Environmental Law’ (2016) 
28(1) Environmental Law and Management, pp. 37-41, at 40-1). 
72 C. Reid, ‘Taking Back Control From Brussels: But Where To?’, Oxford University Press blog, 7 Nov. 2016, 
available at: http://blog.oup.com/2016/11/brexit-uk-eu-brussels: ‘At a less dramatic level, the removal of the 
need to comply with EU law will risk greater divergence within the UK in relation to environmental law.’ See 
Linking this back to the discussion above regarding the effects of Brexit on the UK environment, such 
effects are also likely to depend on the possible greater divergence between, for example, Scottish 
and English environmental law that leaving the EU might produce. The scope for such divergence 
firstly depends on the extent to which repatriated environmental competence is exercised centrally 
by Westminster or is devolved. There is obviously much greater scope for divergence in the latter 
scenario. Whether such divergence would be worse for the environment than the pre-Brexit position 
is hard to predict; it is at least conceivable that all of the devolved governments and England would 
improve environmental quality. Equally possible -- although they have nearly all promised 
otherwise73 -- is that we could see one or more of the component parts of the UK loosen their 
environmental controls from a Brexit baseline, while others (and the EU) maintained or raised theirs. 
Alternatively, and perhaps as likely, is that although standards might not fall below the Brexit 
baseline, some parts of the UK would climb beyond these while others would allow them to 
stagnate.74  
 
7. ENFORCEMENT 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
also Heyvaert and Čavoški, n. 1 above, p. 123. Cf. GMOs, where recent reforms have left much more discretion 
in the hands of Member States in relation to cultivation of GM crops on their territory (see e.g. M. Dobbs, 
‘Attaining Subsidiarity-Based Multilevel Governance of Genetically Modified Cultivation?’ (2016) 28(2) Journal 
of Environmental Law, pp. 245-73). 
73 In their respective White Papers on Brexit, the current Scottish Government has committed to ‘maintaining, 
protecting and enhancing’ the environment (n. 70 above, para. 93) and the Welsh Government ‘at a minimum, 
to maintaining current standards in respect of air and water quality, emissions and environmental protection 
(Welsh Government, ‘Securing Wales’ Future: Transition from the European Union to a New Relationship With 
Europe’ (2017), p. 29). In its Brexit White Paper, the Conservative UK Government similarly states that it ‘is 
committed to ensuring we become the first generation to leave the environment in a better state than we 
found it’ (HM Government, ‘The United Kingdom’s Exit From and New Partnership With the European Union 
(2017) Cm 9417, para. 8.41). However, this should be contrasted with the unwillingness of Government 
ministers, when appearing before the Environmental Audit Committee and having been asked 7 times,  to 
commit to retaining EU air quality limits following Brexit (: Baroness Jones and Baroness Parminter, ‘Green 
Brexit: Safeguarding Britain's environment’, Politics Home, 16 Jan. 2017, available at:  
https://www.politicshome.com/news/uk/environment/house/82418/green-brexit-safeguarding-britains-
environment. 
74 I.e., there is a risk that in some areas the Withdrawal Bill’s transposition of EU environmental law may 
produce ‘zombie’ legislation that sits dustily on the shelf, under-enforced and without being updated in 
accordance with developing scientific standards (HC, EAC Report ‘The Future of the Natural Environment after 
the EU Referendum’, Sixth Report of Session 2016–17, HC 599, para. 39). 
It would be a mistake to examine the potential environmental impacts of leaving the EU only with 
reference to a check-list of policy sectoral winners and losers. As Maria Lee has noted,75 one of the 
major gaps that could be opened up by leaving is an enforcement governance gap. Membership of 
the EU brings with it procedural reporting obligations76 on Member States and exposure to various 
enforcement mechanisms77 to ensure compliance with EU environmental provisions. This broader 
architecture is an essential component of the effectiveness of environmental governance in the UK. 
Some existing UK laws, notably the Climate Change Act 2008, do have their own institutional, 
reporting and enforcement arrangements, which could serve as a source of inspiration when 
constructing a post-Brexit enforcement system.78 However, these arrangements fall short of the 
political and legal accountability mechanisms that the UK has become used to through EU 
membership. In the end, leaving gives rise to concern not just about the future quality of 
environmental legislation, but also about the opportunities for citizens and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) to hold the government to account. Domestic judicial review will of course still 
be available,79 but civil society could lose its ability to hold government to resilient environmental 
standards. One of the core strengths of EU environmental law is the idea that it represents a credible 
long-term commitment which cannot be changed at the whim of individual governments just 
because, for example, they are struggling to meet existing targets. 
The extent to which Brexit would produce an enforcement gap depends in large measure on the 
future relationship model eventually adopted. This is true of both public enforcement by the 
Commission and private enforcement by individuals in the national courts. With a hard Brexit, all of 
this would go. Public enforcement under a soft Brexit Norway/EEA model involves a Surveillance 
                                                          
75 See oral evidence, ‘Brexit: Environment and Climate Change’, n. 20 above. 
76 E.g. Art. 15 Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC [2000] OJ L 327/1 (duty to report on river basin 
management plans to the Commission). 
77 Both public, via Art. 258 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (infringement 
proceedings by the Commission) and private (in national courts relying on doctrines such as direct effect). 
78 Lee, n. 75 above, answers to Q. 9. 
79 The House of Lords European Union Committee report, n. 35 above, which noted witness concerns that 
‘existing domestic judicial review procedures may be inadequate and costly’ (para. 84). Improved access to 
justice is thus likely to be a necessity post-Brexit. 
Authority with similar supervisory powers to the Commission. However, this arrangement lacks the 
ability to impose financial penalties on recalcitrant states.80 The only recourse consists of a second 
appearance before the EFTA Court. This same arrangement applied in the EU before the introduction 
of penalty payments and lump sums, and was considered unsatisfactory. As for private enforcement, 
in EEA law there is still indirect effect81 and state liability82 but there is no direct effect83 and no 
principle of supremacy.84 These latter two doctrines in particular have been central to the ability of 
citizens and NGOs to mobilize EU law effectively in their national courts. 
 
8. BREXIT, SOVEREIGNTY AND CONTROL 
While the first part of the article considered the potential practical consequences of Brexit for 
environmental policy and quality, principally in the UK but also more broadly within the EU, the 
second part examines the normative consequences of Brexit for issues of sovereignty and control. 
The principle of subsidiarity – which involves consideration of and justification for which 
geographical level of action is best suited to particular areas of policy – is very much at the heart of 
these debates. 
Arguably the most powerful narrative put forward by the Leave campaign during the referendum 
campaign was one of ‘taking back control’ and restoring sovereignty to the UK85 – both having 
supposedly been lost to ‘unelected bureaucrats’ in ‘Brussels’. While the key policy area in which 
many on the Leave side wished to regain control from the EU was undoubtedly immigration, with 
                                                          
80 R. Macrory, ‘Brexit Unlikely to Give UK Free Rein Over Green Laws’ (2016) ENDS Report 499, pp. 22-3, at 22; 
Burns et al., n. 1 above, pp. 90, 95. 
81 Case E-4/01 Karlsson v Iceland (2002), para. 28. 
82 Karlsson (ibid), paras 29-33. 
83 Karlsson (ibid), para. 28. 
84 Case E-1/07 Criminal Proceedings against A (2007), paras 40-1. 
85 E. Fisher & J. Harrison, ‘Beyond the Binary: Brexit, Environmental Law, and an Interconnected World’, OUP 
Blog, 19 Sept. 2016, available at http://blog.oup.com/2016/09/binary-brexit-environmental-law/; S. 
Weatherill, ‘Why We Need the European Union ‘, OUP Blog, 20 June 2016, available at 
http://blog.oup.com/2016/06/european-union-control/. 
environmental policy much further down the list,86 it is nevertheless worth exploring what 
implications this narrative might have for the latter.  
 
8.1 Transboundary Environmental Problems 
It has become something of a truism that the environment is an area where individual state 
sovereignty on its own is often powerless to achieve desired environmental outcomes. The 
environment typically does not respect national borders and, hence, states must act together to see 
results. This is a longstanding element within the academic literature on the environment and 
subsidiarity: supranational level action on transboundary environmental problems is justified 
because one state acting alone cannot tackle an environmental problem without other states also 
cooperating.87 Scandinavian acid rain in the 1970s-1980s is often given as an example: it was no use, 
for example, Sweden acting on its own on acid emissions if the UK’s tall power station chimneys 
were largely responsible for the damage caused. Not surprisingly then, in the end, EU level action 
was taken to tackle this problem via the Large Combustion Plant (LCP) Directive,88 which imposed 
limits on acid gas emissions from power stations. What this example shows is that, in relation to 
transboundary problems like air pollution, state sovereignty in isolation gets one nowhere and that 
supranational EU level coordination is likely to produce a more effective pooled sovereignty and 
control. 
8.2 International Law Obligations 
If Brexit was about regaining sovereignty, a counter-narrative occasionally heard on the Remain side 
was that the Leave vision of ‘pure’, untrammelled sovereignty was a myth, in part because the UK 
                                                          
86 Although cf. Neslen, n. 21 above. 
87 See e.g. C Hilson, Regulating Pollution (Hart, 2000), ch. 3; M. Lee, EU Environmental Law: Challenges, Change 
and Decision-Making (Hart, 2005), pp. 9-15. 
88 Directive 2001/80/EC [2001] OJ L309/1, replacing Directive 88/609/EEC. The Directive has now been 
superseded by the Industrial Emissions Directive, n. 10 above. There was also international law coordination, 
considered further below. 
would, post-Brexit, remain subject to binding international law obligations.89 These involved the UK 
voluntarily constraining its sovereignty in order to achieve collective action goals, in much the same 
way as it had done by joining the EU. Reference to these continuing obligations has since become a 
common feature of the emerging commentary on Brexit and the environment. However, this 
argument is something of a double-edged sword for environmentalist Remainers. While it rightly 
picks apart the myth that Brexit will return the UK to a land of ‘year zero’ unrestrained sovereignty,90 
it at the same time undermines an argument that any action transcending the national level must 
necessarily emanate from the EU. Indeed, no state can successfully act alone on many 
environmental issues, and sovereignty must often be constrained in concert with others, but this can 
be done internationally and not just supranationally. The Birds Directive 2009/147/EC provides a 
good example. While very much focused on the, again, transboundary issue of migratory wild birds 
which can only be adequately protected by states acting together, the Council of Europe Bern 
Convention91 and Bonn Convention (or CMS)92 also provide important international law protection 
for migratory wild birds. The 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution93 – 
introduced to tackle acid rain across Europe and which preceded the EU LCP Directive discussed 
above – is another example.94 To be sure, there are some additional advantages to supranational 
level action over the international: EU rules tend to be more tightly framed than their international 
equivalents, with concrete timetables for expected compliance, and also benefit from more effective 
                                                          
89 A point also made by e.g. D. French, ‘Alternate Realities: Brexit and Pokémon’, OUP blog, 10 Oct. 2016, 
available at http://blog.oup.com/2016/10/brexit-pokemon-go-law/; Reid, n. 72 above; and Fisher & Harrison, 
n. 85 above. 
90 As Scotford notes: ‘If we are to think again about what standards we want to subscribe to as a nation and 
how to enforce these, this does not happen in a vacuum of legal development and expertise once we leave the 
European Union’ (E. Scotford, ‘Air Quality Law in the United Kingdom at a Crossroads’, OUP Blog, 3 Oct. 2016,  
available at http://blog.oup.com/2016/10/air-quality-law-
environment/#sthash.Hq1ROMWO.QoyeWqC9.dpufhttp://blog.oup.com/2016/10/air-quality-law-
environment/. 
91 N. 69 above. 
92 Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, Bonn (Germany) 23 June 1979, in 
force 1 Nov. 1983. Available at: http://www.cms.int/en/convention-text. 
93 Geneva (Switzerland) 13 Nov. 1979, in force 16 March 1983. Available at: 
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/lrtap/full%20text/1979.CLRTAP.e.pdf. 
94 Scotford, n. 90 above. See also Haigh, n. 10 above, at pp. 49-51. 
mechanisms for enforcement.95 Nevertheless, the point remains, at least in part. In any event, as 
French has noted, post-Brexit, UK environmental lawyers can be expected to turn their attention 
much more closely to all relevant international law instruments.96 Future research should look, in 
particular, at the gaps between EU law provisions and their supposedly equivalent international law 
counterparts.97 The UK courts too (aided by creative NGOs and their lawyers), might be expected to 
play a role in ensuring that international law obligations can be appropriately enforced.98 
8.3 UK Devolution Arrangements 
If EU level supranational coordination on the environment falls away, then what is to fill the gap? Is 
there then a justification for centralized or coordinated environmental action at a UK level, in line 
with a principle of subsidiarity similar to that which animated EU-level environmental action itself,99  
to deal with issues that the devolved parts of the UK cannot satisfactorily address on their own? The 
question arises because the environment is currently a devolved matter, where competence is 
effectively shared with the EU. After a hard Brexit, does repatriated EU competence over the 
environment similarly become devolved to become the exclusive competence of Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland, or should at least some of it be centralized and competence be shared with 
Westminster?100 This issue is all the more pressing where no equivalent international law fall-back 
exists to provide a direct replacement for EU law.101 
                                                          
95 See also e.g. Haigh, who makes this point when arguing in favour of the LCP Directive, n. 10 above, at pp. 50-
1. However, the point is principally true of old governance-style EU directives. New governance measures, such 
as the proposed EU Renewables Directive (COM(2016) 767 final), offer a less impressively robust scope for 
enforcement.  
96 French, above n. 89. See also Reid, n. 72 above, who notes that ‘The extent of such treaty obligations can be 
easily overlooked since in recent decades the measures needed to give effect to them have often been 
introduced into the UK through EU law’. 
97 UKELA (The UK Environmental Law Association) is due to produce an international law mapping report later 
in 2017. See https://www.ukela.org/brexitactivity.  
98 See Macrory, n. 80 above, for suggestions on this. 
99 See Hilson, and Lee, n. 87 above. 
100 This question is implicit in the title of Colin Reid’s blog, n. 72 above: ‘Taking back control from Brussels – but 
where to?’. 
101 Even where international law is in place, policing divergence across the various constituent administrations 
of the UK, so that the UK as a whole does not breach its obligations under that law, may be harder than with 
reference to EU law. See Reid, n. 72 above. 
The difficulty that centralized Westminster control faces is one of wariness by the devolved nations, 
whose sovereignty over environmental policy and other areas was hard-won through the devolution 
settlements.102 While repatriation of EU competence to Westminster would not involve a loss of 
existing sovereignty, devolved administrations are nevertheless understandably reluctant to replace 
the old EU master with a new, Westminster one.103 This reluctance may be due to the potential for 
Westminster to ultimately allow less discretion in implementation than the EU system provided, and 
also for it to be more capriciously deregulatory, again in contrast to the slow pace of change we have 
come to associate with mature EU environmental law. The various Brexit White Papers provide an 
interesting insight on the matter. The Scottish and Welsh documents both effectively claim a 
presumption in favour of full devolution in already devolved areas like environmental policy, with 
their consent needed for central pooling, in what would need to be a new joint arrangement.104 The 
UK and Welsh Government recognize a clear need for some form of arrangement where there is a 
risk of fragmenting the UK’s internal market.105  This takes us back to subsidiarity and the various 
justifications for central control over the environment. Preserving an internal UK market from non-
tariff barriers to trade forms one key justification for the central harmonization of standards. The 
definition of waste is an example of a case where the adoption of a common, UK-wide standard 
would be justified on this ground. Of course, since the UK exports a large amount of domestic waste 
                                                          
102 See joint statement by First Minister of Scotland Nicola Sturgeon and First Minister of Wales Carwyn Jones 
in response to the introduction of the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, 13 July 2017. ‘We … recognise that 
common frameworks to replace EU laws across the UK may be needed in some areas. But the way to achieve 
these aims is through negotiation and agreement, not imposition. It must be done in a way which respects the 
hard-won devolution settlements.’ Available at: https://news.gov.scot/news/eu-withdrawal-bill. 
103 See e.g. Steffan Lewis, Plaid Cymru Welsh Assembly Member, Welsh Assembly, The External Affairs and 
Additional Legislation Committee, ‘Leaving the European Union: Implications for Wales—Environment and 
Marine’, 31 Oct. 2016, at paras 151-2, available at 
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to the rest of the EU in the form of refuse-derived fuel, this may well be an area where the UK 
chooses not to diverge from the EU definition. As the UKELA Waste Working Party observed: 
It could, in theory, be possible to have one definition for waste that was traded only 
nationally within England and Wales while still applying the EU and Basel Convention 
definitions for waste exports. Would this result in a greater or lesser regulatory burden to 
industry?106 
In principle, it would also be possible to have different definitions of waste within the UK. 
Nevertheless, this too is unlikely to prove attractive in terms of legal certainty and ease of trading for 
businesses operating across the UK’s own internal market. Industry would hardly welcome having 
separate definitions for different jurisdictions within the UK. It would therefore require some form 
of UK regulatory governance framework to deliver an agreed definition of waste, – whether one that 
matches the EU definition, or a common UK definition. Questions of waste are partly covered by 
international law (Basel107), but its definition of waste – rather unhelpfully for present purposes – 
links back to national law108 and applies only to exports. In that sense it cannot directly replace EU 
law.  
While crafting a common UK definition of waste, and potentially also streamlining it with the EU 
definition, may be considered on the basis of a product-type, trade justification, another typical 
subsidiarity justification for federal level action on the environment relates to averting unfair 
competition between states in a race to the bottom on standards. For example, what if, in the 
absence of the EU Industrial Emissions Directive (IED),109 England decided to apply lower standards 
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than in the devolved administrations, hoping to make itself more attractive to investment through 
lower pollution control costs? Would this justify a common set of UK BREF110-type standards to avoid 
this unfair and environmentally harmful competition? Again, there is no obvious single international 
law replacement for the EU IED. What of possible devolved administration concerns over central 
control on race to the bottom grounds? One way of meeting these would be to set only minimum 
standards centrally. These would act as a floor, with the devolved administrations and England then 
free to choose their own standards above this level, but unable to go below it.111 Such a floor might 
usefully be set at the level of existing EU standards. This approach would have much in common with 
EU law, which similarly typically allows Member States to adopt stricter measures (a point returned 
to again later). 
A third major subsidiarity-based justification for centralized action on the environment applies when 
transboundary issues are involved, such as cross-border pollution or wildlife migration. In a UK 
context, the question arises of precisely what form such centralized control should take. For air 
pollution and migratory species which potentially range over large distances, central standards are 
likely to be justified. For water pollution, while a common set of standards can be justified at EU 
level because numerous cross-border watercourses transverse many continental countries, the UK 
situation involves much smaller numbers. This means that, instead of a centralized UK framework 
that draws up common regulatory standards across the various jurisdictions within the UK, one 
could instead seek to coordinate literally only at the borders. 
As things stand, cross-border rivers within the UK (such as the Tweed between Scotland and 
England) are dealt with by legislation which seeks to coordinate the work of the respective 
environment agencies to achieve the river basin approach required by the EU Water Framework 
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Directive.112 However, this cross-border cooperation currently happens towards the achievement of 
common water quality standards laid down in the Directive. After Brexit, water quality goals within 
the UK might start to diverge. Maintaining common standards across the UK might still be justified 
on race to the bottom, competition grounds, so that industry and farming do not face different 
ambient quality targets which will inevitably lead to different emissions standards and controls on 
diffuse pollution, but not on the grounds of controlling cross-border pollution. After all, the various 
national environment agencies within the UK could simply coordinate, on cross-border rivers only, to 
ensure that stricter standards are not compromised by those of their neighbour.  
Rivers that cross from the UK into another EU Member State (such as the Shannon into Ireland) 
would also be impacted by Brexit. These are currently dealt with under the Water Framework 
Directive as International River Basin Districts, requiring coordination between the Member States to 
achieve the Directive’s goals.113 On Brexit, Northern Ireland would no longer be part of an EU 
Member State and would hence be subject to treatment by Ireland under article 3(5) of the 
Directive, which states: 
Where a river basin district extends beyond the territory of the Community, the Member 
State or Member States concerned shall endeavour to establish appropriate coordination 
with the relevant non-Member States, with the aim of achieving the objectives of this 
Directive throughout the river basin district. Member States shall ensure the application of 
the rules of this Directive within their territory.   
Such coordination could in theory become more difficult given that Northern Ireland would no 
longer be subject to the requirements of the Directive and might end up with different standards. 
However, the Irish river example is unlikely to give rise to severe problems because of the United 
                                                          
112 Directive 2000/60/EC (n 65). The Water Environment (Water Framework Directive) (Solway Tweed River 
Basin District) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/99. 
113 Art. 3(3)-(4). 
Nations Watercourses Convention (UNWC),114 to which the UK and Ireland are both signatories. 
Article 21(3) UNWC states: 
Watercourse states shall, at the request of any of them, consult with a view to arriving at 
mutually agreeable measures and methods to prevent, reduce and control pollution of an 
international watercourse, such as: (a) Setting joint water quality objectives and criteria; (b) 
Establishing techniques and practices to address pollution from point and non-point sources; 
(c) Establishing lists of substances, the introduction of which into the waters of an 
international watercourse is to be prohibited, limited, investigated or monitored. 
In the Scottish example in contrast, the UNWC would not apply because the Convention only applies 
between states and not to devolved nations within them. However, some very similar form of cross-
border cooperation would be needed. 
 
8.4 New Governance and Multi-level Governance 
‘New governance’, a key strand of practice and scholarship within EU law and politics during the 
previous decade,115 is also worth considering in relation to issues of control and sovereignty. As 
Fisher and Harrison have suggested, there is a danger in seeing Brexit and environmental 
sovereignty in strictly binary terms, with control and sovereignty either completely preserved or 
completely lost.116 While a large part of the original EU environmental acquis was very much aimed 
at uniformity across Member States, with centralization of power at EU level in order to achieve it, 
this ‘old governance’ approach has since then often been replaced by new governance. The latter 
                                                          
114 Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, New York (U.S.A.) 21 
May 1997, in force 17 Aug. 2014. Available at: 
legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_3_1997.pdf. 
115 See e.g. J. Scott & D. Trubek, ‘Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in the European 
Union’ (2002) 8(1) European Law Journal, pp. 1-18; G. De Búrca & J. Scott (eds.), Law and New Governance in 
the EU and the US (Hart, 2006); C.F. Sabel & J. Zeitlin, ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the EU’ (2008) 14(3) European Law Journal, pp. 271-327. 
116 N. 85 above. 
allows greater discretion to be left in the hands of Member States, affording them to greater 
determination of their own path via a decentralized approach. The new EU approach to genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) provides a good example, allowing for a degree of flexibility in Member 
State choices on the cultivation of GM crops on their territory.117 Renewables provide another 
example. The original EU Renewables Directive118 imposed binding (albeit differentiated)119 targets 
on Member States in order to reach the overall EU target.120 Even these binding targets allowed 
‘Member States a large discretion on the choice of national measures’.121 Nevertheless, the proposal 
for a revised Renewable Energy Directive goes one step further in abandoning binding national 
targets altogether. Instead, it maintains an overall target for the EU but, espousing a bottom-up 
perspective similar to that reflected in the nationally determined contributions of the Paris 
Agreement, the overall target is said to be ‘best achieved through a partnership with Member States 
combining their national actions supported by a framework of measures as outlined in this 
Proposal’.122 
However, it would be mistaken to see the old approach to EU environmental governance as wholly 
centralizing. After all, Directives, which famously leave Member States a degree of implementing 
discretion, were a key source of law used at that time.123 Similarly, Article 193 TFEU has long allowed 
Member States to adopt more stringent measures than in EU legislation in many circumstances.124 
EU environmental directives are seldom exhaustively harmonizing. Taking back control in this 
                                                          
117 M. Lee, ‘The Ambiguity of Multi-Level Governance and (De)-harmonisation in EU Environmental Law’ (2013) 
15 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, pp. 357-81; Dobbs, n. 72 above. 
118 2009/28/EC [2009] OJ L140/16. 
119 See recital 15: ‘The starting point, the renewable energy potential and the energy mix of each Member 
State vary. It is therefore necessary to translate the Community 20 % target into individual targets for each 
Member State’. 
120 See recital 14: ’The main purpose of mandatory national targets is to provide certainty for investors’. 
121 Proposal for a Directive on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, COM(2016) 767 
final, p. 4. 
122 Ibid. Member States will still have binding obligations to produce National Energy and Climate Plans and to 
report on these (under a separate proposal on the Energy Union Governance). 
123 Although, as Dobbs, n. 72 above, p. 248 notes, there is an important difference between implementation 
power and the power to make policy decisions. 
124 See D. Langlet & S. Mahmoudi, EU Environmental Law and Policy (OUP, 2016), at p. 102. 
context therefore means taking back control to adopt weaker standards, because control to have 
stricter ones was already largely there under Article 193 TFEU.  
It would be equally mistaken to claim that new governance is now wholly in the ascendant: in some 
areas such as the EU ETS, initial decentralization (in setting national allocation plans – NAPS) has 
since given rise to a more centralized system (with the Commission setting an EU-wide cap on 
emissions).125 However, from a sovereignty and control perspective, the examples of new 
governance such as GMOs and renewables illustrate that EU environmental policy, especially in 
some of its more recent incarnations, does not always involve Member States losing all control to a 
highly centralized EU level. This phenomenon can also be explained through a multi-level 
governance (MLG) lens.126 MLG theory argues that not all power rests with states; rather, it is 
diffused across multiple levels, potentially from the local to the international. Therefore, to the 
extent that states retain a degree of sovereign policy decision-making power over particular EU 
policy areas like GMOs and renewables above, sovereignty and control exist at more than one level. 
Nevertheless, while it is important to point to the overlapping issues of new governance and MLG  in 
order to establish that Brexiteers would be mistaken in thinking of EU environmental policy as an 
area over which the UK had fully lost control (which needed to be regained),these considerations 
should not be read as wholesale normative support for such approaches. Where the EU acts in a way 
that is perceived by the environmental movement as anti-environmental – such as on the subject of 
GMOs – then of course there will be a temptation to support new governance flexibility for Member 
States, as this would allow them to make their own, more ambitious environmental choices. 
However, by and large, EU environmental policy is environmentally progressive. In most cases, new 
governance flexibility could result in Member States watering down standards, which can hardly be 
regarded as a good thing environmentally. It remains to be seen, for example, whether the bottom-
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up approach of the proposal for a revised renewables directive will be as effective environmentally 
as the existing Directive with its binding Member State targets. That Member States are capable of 
watering down can be seen in relation to the EU ETS, where a number of Member States had come 
up with very weak NAPs. This led to more recent EU centralization, away from the previous 
ineffective new governance-style NAPs. This more centralized approach is likely to be 
environmentally beneficial and to secure greater, collective control over climate change than 
national control over NAPs provided. Hence, there is often a lot to be said for old governance and EU 
as opposed to national control may well produce better environmental outcomes. 
In recent years, the MLG governance approach has also been particularly prevalent in the context of 
the perceived ‘governance gap’ in relation to climate change.127 The argument here is that lower 
governance levels (including cities128 and states within federal systems like the US) can to some 
extent make up for the lack of national and international progress on climate change. While this 
approach has a descriptive accuracy and also a certain normative appeal, one should again be wary 
of attaching excessive importance to this perspective in relation to Brexit. While lower governance 
levels provide a much needed supplement to state and international action on climate change, they 
cannot provide a replacement for action at the latter levels. Thus, in the context of Brexit, the EU 
and climate change, and indeed environmental law more generally, one needs to beware of 
fallacious reasoning. The governance gap and the lessons from MLG that modern environmental law 
is not all about control at or by one single authority – the state – should not be misinterpreted as 
validating the proposition that any Brexit-resulting demise of forceful EU action on climate change 
or, indeed, any subsequent weakening of UK level action in this area, is therefore unproblematic.    
 
9. CONCLUSION 
                                                          
127 L. Vanhala & C. Hilson, ‘Climate Change Litigation: Symposium Introduction’ (2013) 35(3) Law & Policy 141-
9, at p. 143. 
128 Via e.g. the covenant of mayors, on which see further V. Heyvaert, ‘What's in a Name? The Covenant of 
Mayors as Transnational Environmental Regulation’ (2013) 22(1) RECIEL, pp. 78-90. 
In assessing the environmental implications of Brexit, I have argued for a systematic, dynamic 
analysis of the effect of the UK’s membership of the EU on the environment. However, this should 
not be taken as a claim that leaving may, somehow, not be so bad after all. A benefit of using a table 
like the one presented in the current article is that the balance of positives to negatives can easily be 
seen. And a glance at the table confirms that there are far more positives than negatives to the UK’s 
existing relationship. The only way to preserve all of these would be by the UK remaining a full 
member. Given that this seems inconceivable, the second best solution would be an EEA-style soft 
Brexit or one where (unlike in the Swiss model) the EU insists on a considerable proportion of the 
environmental acquis being respected as a condition of single market membership.129  Although the 
EEA route also seems improbable, the June 2017 UK election result makes some form of soft Brexit a 
more likely outcome.130 While these two particular soft Brexit options would not preserve the 
positive, top right box of Table 1, they would at least preserve much of the positive, bottom right 
qualities. However, even with a hard Brexit, given the single market influence, the bottom right and 
left boxes would not entirely disappear. 
In considering issues of sovereignty and control in the specific context of environmental governance, 
I stressed the importance of the principle of subsidiarity. Effective control over the environment 
often requires collaboration between states, particularly in the case of transboundary pollution or 
wildlife migration. While this might involve pooling sovereignty via multilateral or bilateral 
international agreements rather than via supranational EU level action, the drafting and 
enforcement advantages of EU law mean that the latter will typically offer the most effective 
control. It also became clear that Brexit, depending on its eventual shape, is likely to give rise to 
contestation over environmental sovereignty and control within a devolved UK. In the absence of 
common EU federal action on the environment post-Brexit, subsidiarity suggests that there will be a 
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need for the UK to create a similar centralized system internally in some areas of environmental 
policy. However, having fought hard for sovereignty over the environment as a devolved matter, the 
devolved administrations have already begun to express a degree of hostility towards the idea that 
Westminster might take back control at the centre when the EU environmental acquis is repatriated. 
In the end then, the environment reveals sovereignty to be much more complicated than many 
Brexiteers may have imagined. The UK will still want many of the functions that the EU served in 
relation to the environment to be carried out. Taking the EU out of the equation simply means that 
these subsidiarity-justified functions have to be performed elsewhere: via international law 
cooperation and via central UK control. Pooling UK sovereignty with other states remains necessary 
for the former; and pooling at least some sovereignty that would otherwise be devolved seems 
inevitable for the latter. 
